Wundt and Bühler on Gestural Expression: From Psycho-Physical Mirroring to the Diacrisis by Vassilicos, Basil
Basil Vassilicos 
basil.vassilicos@mic.ul.ie 
Philosophy of Language in the Brentano Tradition 
A. Dewalque, S. Richard, C. Gauvry., ed. London: Palgrave, (forthcoming)  
WUNDT AND BÜHLER ON GESTURAL EXPRESSION: FROM PSYCHO-PHYSICAL 
MIRRORING TO THE DIACRISIS 
INTRODUCTION 
Contemporary research on gestures - as an empirical, interdisciplinary body of work 
involving anthropology, linguistics, philosophy, and psychology – can be characterised as 
having a couple of overarching traits. In the first place, it seems disposed toward a kind of 
empirical but also egalitarian prudence when it comes the relation of gestures to those 
communication phenomena typically designated as having to do with language or speech. 
With increased attention being given to gestured [e.g. signed] languages as robust and wholly 
developed communicative systems in their own right (i.e. not merely derivative of other 
linguistic systems) has also come a reluctance to reduce gestural expression to verbal 
expression, or vice versa.1 A second feature has to do with how gestures are delineated as 
‘integral’ phenomena for scientific investigation in their own right, namely as fully fledged 
‘partners’ if not self-sufficient components within any human communicative interaction, 
with the potential if not requirement to contribute just as much as that other much more well-
known and oft-studied partner, i.e. verbal language. That is, there is a strong focus today on 
the multi-modality of human communicative action, meaning, depending on one’s point of 
view, co-speech gestures or co-gestured speech.  
 A simple example can illustrate this multimodal approach to gestures and language. 
Two people are bent over a bit of exposed dirt in a field, in discussion with each other about 
something they are excavating.2 In so communicating, they might use words, but also their 
hands and the tools they are holding. For instance, the one person might complete a verbal 
phrase with a gesture with her right hand that traces an outline in the dirt. In response, the 
other might show an understanding of this tracing as the joint object of scrutiny by repeating 
the same pointing gesture and then take it as the point of departure for both her own gesture 
with her trowel and her further verbal communication. 
 Two things are noteworthy here. First, if by ‘gesture’ what is meant is body 
information provided in this example of communicative interaction, then only certain types 
of body information seem relevant to be being counted as gestures; namely those that are 
express or intentional movements or configurations of the body, and not such things as one’s 
rate of pulse or breathing, one’s pallor, or one’s twitches. This is nonetheless a fluid and 
pragmatic distinction. The lower threshold of gestural expressions may be quite hard to 
establish definitively, and this means certain ‘body information’, like one’s stance or mien, 
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may pass from one to the other side of this distinction, based on circumstances or other 
factors. Importantly, this fluidity does not seem to impinge upon how, as stressed by Kendon 
(2004: 11-13), humans seem adept at judging just which body information is relevant to the 
interaction as “deliberate, expressive action,” that is, as gestures.3  
Second, in this example the persons involved are deploying different sorts of 
communicative “resources,” each with their own distinct features, yet which are nonetheless 
“interdependent phenomena” (Streeck et al 2011: 3). The first person’s initial verbal phrase 
is a kind of directive whose object and content can only be understood via her gesture, and 
their interlocutor can immediately grasp this. Likewise, the second person’s own gesture in 
response will provide the referent for what she might go on to express verbally; indeed, one 
can easily imagine a case where whatever else she will say verbally will have already been 
expressed in her trowel gesture. The nature of the semantic and performative relationships 
between these distinct phenomena seems to run in both directions, from both gesture to 
speech and speech to gesture. 
 From the moment there is recognition of distinctive communicative resources 
enmeshed in human communicative interaction, there arise questions about the conditions, 
rules, or norms – broadly speaking, the ‘grammar’ – under which this enmeshing occurs, in 
the co- or alternating performance of gesture and speech. For instance, the more someone 
would be committed to a kind of ‘semantic holism,’ the more they would be required to come 
to a position on the underlying nature of the fundamental (inter)relation of gesture and 
speech which multimodality would denote. This is a fascinating but challenging question for 
contemporary philosophy and linguistics.4 In the latter, for one, one finds numerous careful 
attempts to identify and catalogue different sorts of multimodality in human communication, 
in different contexts and cultural situations, but a basic concern remains as to how best to 
arrive at hypotheses about why such phenomena of multimodality should take certain forms 
rather than others. Should such rules or conditions be understood primarily in terms of the 
regulating limitations and competencies of the human organism in its psychic and corporeal 
constitution? Are they strictly dictated by the material conditions of the human interaction,5 
or by the historical customs and cultural conventions of their upbringing and surroundings? 
Notably, proposals of this last sort would fall under a relativistic or even psychologistic 
position on the notion of the ‘grammar’ of multimodal communication. 
 By contrast, are such rules or conditions dictated by some sort of intrinsic, adequative 
link between whatever communicative motivation is going on ‘inside’ an individual and the 
external expressive (gestural and/or speech) utterance, as has been shown was the case for 
Wittgenstein and Scheler in the context of emotional expressions (Mulligan 2012: 63)? Might 
the rules for combining gestural and verbal expression be thought in terms of dependent, co-
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dependent, or independent parts and wholes, or in terms of how a certain Meinen or 
communicative intention with a determinate content gets parsed across these different 
semiotic resources, while still meeting sufficiency conditions for expression in each mode and 
within the whole? May there be certain structural conditions imposed upon such multimodal 
communication (across gesture and verbal expression) whose necessity is independent of 
any human specific communicative function or need? What might they be and how might one 
identify them? 
 In the ensuing, we aim to broach these questions by exploring how Wundt’s and 
Bühler’s respective theories of gestural expression would treat them. This will require some 
careful positioning of each figure with respect to this line of questioning. It does not go 
without saying that that what Bühler investigates as gestures entirely correlates with how 
gestures are studied today (Friedrich 2012: 210, note 14), and the same might be said for 
Wundt as well. It will thus have to be shown how there are sufficient conceptual grounds for 
connecting these past thinkers with today’s approaches, and to do so we shall proceed in the 
following manner. With Wundt, the goal is to see how he advocates a problematic position on 
the relationship of gesture and language, which stems from his underlying conception of 
expression. Such a demonstration will allow us to recognise and develop a critique of a neo-
Wundtian position that has surfaced in contemporary work on gestures. With Bühler, on the 
other hand, the goal will be to outline a positive contribution to these questions, which is on 
the one hand structurally focused and phenomenologically grounded but which on the other 
remains empirically informed and thus commensurable with recent accounts of gesture. 
WUNDT, EXPRESSION, GRAMMAR 
The verdict on Wundt’s theories of language by Danziger, already in 1983, seems categorical 
and unstinting; “[they are] of limited interest today” (1983: 308). For Danziger, with his 
emphasis on Wundt’s conception of Völkerpsychologie, perhaps the only source of curiosity is 
that of the historian in what might have been. But can Wundt say nothing to us today? 
 There is indeed still much to appreciate in Wundt, at least in light of his analysis of 
gestural expressions: the considerable granularity of his catalogue of different kinds of 
gestures; his proto-pragmatic recognition that facial expressions provide the basic tone 
[Grundton] for interpreting gestures (1977: 86); the innovative manner in which he broaches 
the issue of the grammar or syntax of gestures. These reasons aside, one further motivation 
still to take an interest in Wundt is that his intellectual legacy seems very much alive and well 
today, albeit under another, not very explicitly Wundtian form. What is meant here is the 
widely influential ‘Growth Point’ [GP] theory of the psychologist David McNeill and his 
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colleagues, which has become paradigmatic for a number of studies on gesture today (De 
Ruiter and De Beer 2013: 1015; Kendon 2004: 77-78).6 For McNeill, the notion of ‘growth 
point’ is meant to capture how a person’s thoughts can come to different means of expression, 
through either speech or gesture or both; the growth point is “[t]he initial organising impulse 
of an utterance, and the starting point for developing its meaning; [it is] a minimal, 
irreducible, psychological unit that (…) is a microcosm of the whole utterance” (Duncan et al 
2007: 5).   
 Such a notion already indicates a kind of affinity with the Wundtian view of 
communication (Mitteilung),7 but even more decisive for establishing the link to Wundt is 
how gestures and co-speech gestures are understood by McNeill. Of the gestures he deems 
most interesting and relevant for investigation, he writes that they are “idiosyncratic 
spontaneous movements of the hands and arms accompanying speech [which] can be taken 
to reveal the utterance’s primitive stage” (McNeill 1992: 40); with these gestures, “people 
unwittingly display their inner thoughts and ways of understanding events of the world (….) 
Gestures are like thoughts themselves (...) [and] belong, not to the outside world, but to the 
inside one of memory, thought, and mental images” (McNeill 1992: 12).8 Statements like these 
seem to have a Wundtian conception of gestural expression at their core. To understand why 
that is and the questions they invite, we need to understand the role of the principle of psycho-
physical parallelism (PPP) in Wundt’s own theory of language and expression. 
 Wundt’s PPP may be understood as a neo-Leibnizian thesis about the “contents of 
experience” [Erfahrungsinhalt] which makes two related claims. First, it holds that these 
contents are available to two sorts of scientific investigation, the one ‘indirect,’ via brain- or 
neuro-science, and the other ‘direct,’ via psychology. Second, it postulates that every process 
on the one side of that distinction has to have a corresponding process on the other side 
(Wundt 1896/7: 389). As cited by Rieber, Brentano apparently claimed that Wundt “forfeits 
the unity of mental life” by saddling himself with the PPP; in so doing, “he gives himself three 
problems instead of one” (2001: 152). These are, ostensibly, the relation of the neuro-physical 
processes to experience, the relation of psychological processes to experience, and the 
relation of the unity of the neuro-physical and the psychological to experience. In Wundt’s 
defence, one could say he sought to define the PPP only as a sort of “general heuristic 
principle” for phenomena that seemed quite disparate (Fahrenberg 2012: 230). These are, as 
Ungeheuer explains, phenomena in the bio-physical system of the human being that do not 
seem to obey the law of the conservation of energy (in terms of inputs and outputs) (1984: 
16). As such, Wundt could be seen to be advocating a kind of methodological dualism with 
which to explore “a unitary, monistic conception of life,” for instance, as evinced in the two 
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very different approaches to gestural expression taken in the first two chapters of the Sprache 
volume of his Völkerpsychologie. 
 The interesting problems arise from the way that Wundt comes to rely on the PPP 
when he turns his attention to human social phenomena and especially what he calls the 
‘drive to communicate’. As commentators like Bühler (1933) and Nerlich and Clarke (1998) 
have pointed out, this parallelism - initially serving as a methodological safeguard against 
confusing two sets of facts or two frames of references - morphs into something more, namely 
a descriptive framework by which Wundt analyses human communication in general and 
gestural expression in particular. As Bühler stresses in his critique of Wundt in the former’s 
Ausdruckstheorie, the PPP goes from being a more cautious claim about the intimate 
relationship between the neuro-physical and the experiential domains to a much more 
ambitious or “generous” (Bühler’s term) thesis. Namely, the PPP for Wundt also comes to 
imply a expressive thesis concerning an ‘mirroring’ between the inner psychic state and the 
‘outer’ gestural expression (Bühler 1933: 133) and a pro-social thesis about the mirroring 
between the psychic states of the persons involved communicative interactions. 
 To understand the thrust of Bühler’s critique of such an ambitious thesis and its 
relevance today, it will be useful to clarify how Wundt understands gestural expression 
according to the PPP. On the whole for Wundt, the expressible contents of the psychic life of 
human beings are constituted by affects, as counterparts to the physical excitations of the 
body.9 These affects, which are themselves complexes of sensations that alone would not be 
expressed (Wundt 1904: 45, 47), give rise to a binary drive that underpins the basic forms of 
human expressive activities. On the one hand, the drive pushes for comprehension 
(Verständigung) of the affect, namely by associating it with a representation [Vorstellung] that 
can then be linked to other representations and their respective affects. On the other, the 
drive pushes for communication (Mitteilung) of the affect via bodily movements. In this 
respect, Wundt can then claim “the gesture is the direct expression of the concept which at 
the moment governs the affect” (Wundt 1977: 147).10 
 There can be no doubt that Wundt sees such an analysis of gestural expression as 
wholly consistent with the PPP (Wundt 1904: 90). However, processes running in parallel 
with each does not necessarily mean that that they mirror each other, yet this is just the 
direction in which Wundt takes his interpretation of the PPP. This can be seen in how the PPP 
underwrites Wundt's view of the relation between speaking (a physiological activity) and 
understanding (a mental activity). He regards speaking and understanding as mirror image 
processes, a view that allowed him to dispense with any particular psychological theory of 
how understanding, especially understanding of speech in a social context, is possible 
(Knobloch 1992: 415). Moreover, further evidence of the link between the PPP and a notion 
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of mirroring can be found in the manner in which Wundt delineates only certain gestures to 
be relevant to his study of the psychology of human communication. In a manner that shows 
a striking relationship to McNeill’s perspective mentioned earlier, Wundt claims that those 
gestures that come from “arbitrary agreement,” i.e. via conventions, are of little importance 
for the psychologist of language (Wundt 1977: 70). Much more relevant are those gestures 
that constitute an expressive “means derived from the direct drive to communicate [which 
are] on the whole unpremeditated” and thus that demonstrate a “greater primitiveness” (ibid. 
75). This nomination by Wundt of only certain gestures to be investigated leaves questions 
about the use of arbitrary or conventional gestures something of a mystery to him; they may 
stem from an affect or they may not, but Wundt’s psychologist of language will never be able 
to get to the heart of the matter one way or another. The primitive, psychologically interesting 
gestural expressions, on the other hand, manifest a direct inner connection to the affect that 
generates the drive to communicate, and indeed do so in a regular or constant fashion - what 
he calls in a passage that Bühler emphasises, “inseparable characteristic expressive 
movements.” (Wundt 1904: 100). 
 With such an assertion, Wundt is perhaps not too far off from Ekman and Friesen’s 
thesis that human emotions have certain universally shared facial expressions across all 
peoples of the world (1975). This idea would demonstrate one meaning of the notion of 
mirroring to which Bühler’s critique alludes; a faithful and constant mirroring between 
affects in the body and the movements to which they give rise, where affect and movement 
reflect each other to such an extent that the occurrence of the one even seems to motivate the 
occurrence of the other.11 However, there is still another sense of mirroring that comes into 
play in Wundt’s account, which can be seen as a further implication of the previous one; there 
is also mirroring between individuals, where expressive movements in a communicator can 
give rise to (co-) expressive movements in the addressee - what he calls Mitbewegungen - 
which in turn link back in the addressee’s mind to affects and respective concepts. As he 
writes, “(…) the [gestural] expression provides a firm basis for the mirroring 
(Widerspiegelung] of the affective movement [Gemütsbewegung] in the addressee” and 
“excites further concepts associated with the gesture, develops the gesture, or perhaps even 
elicits its own opposite” (1977: 147). One might find something chilling about the social world 
hereby sketched by Wundt – one to some extent also present in McNeill (2012: 65, 154-56) - 
where all human beings are linked in some great chain of mirror neurons. More seriously, 
such a deployment and transposition of the PPP into a principle of pro-social mirroring 
between individuals seems to expose a serious flaw in Wundt’s analysis, for which Bühler will 
take him to task; Wundt seems to miss entirely the interactive, person-to-person 
interdependent character of gestural expression.  
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 This can be seen in how Wundt approaches our earlier question about the rules or 
conditions according to which gestures are performed (with or without speech). In analysing 
the performance of a series of gestures that form a certain sentence (i.e. comparing how 
gestures flow and are linked together with respect to how words in speech flow and are linked 
together), Wundt considers the following question: why might the order of the subject and 
predicate be reversed, as seems more often to be the case in gestural communication?12 
Wundt’s answer is both striking and entirely consonant with his approach. He argues that 
there are two reasons for such a reversal. On the one hand, gestures have a certain “slowness” 
of performance with respect to speech, which is due to the time it takes for the hands to make 
sequential movements. On the other, certain affects have a higher degree of excitation and 
thus a higher pressure to be expressed (Wundt 1977: 123). To accommodate these two 
factors, the communicating individual finds it necessary to reverse subject and predicate in 
cases of “animated, excited speech.” (ibid. 124). To use a metaphor, it is as if the gesturing 
communicator were like an overworked postal worker having to deliver parcels in function 
of their urgency or encumbrance for the sender, instead of according to address, order of 
intake, etc.  
 The implication in such a view of communication is that it is the human capacities for 
processing of mental content plus the physical limitations of the human body that chiefly 
constrain or condition gesture performance. There can be no question for Wundt of the 
gestural expression being necessarily or structurally determined, for instance, in function of 
the conditions under which another person would understand such expression or with 
respect to an aim to evaluate the response by that other person to one’s own gesture. This 
means that, on Wundt’s view, if we aim to understand under what conditions gestural 
expression can be performed, then we ought first and foremost to focus our scientific 
attention on the conditions under which an affect can be manifested - for instance, whether 
the affect is strong (“excited”) or weak, confusing or clear, new or old, etc.   
For the theorist of language of a pragmatic or Martyian persuasion, for whom 
manifestation (Kundgabe) and intimation (Kundnahme) form two interrelated, indispensable, 
yet distinct functions of human communication (Cesalli 2009: 47, 51), such an emphasis on 
the conditions of manifestation of the affect will seem like a rather problematic view for 
understanding the conditions under which gestural and verbal expression are related. This 
view nonetheless seems influential in some current work on gesture. In particular, it surfaces 
McNeill’s ontogenetic view, as a further development of his GP theory, that the origin of 
language lies in the happy circumstance that our brains are organised in a certain way (2012: 
154). It moreover seems to underlie the motivation to rely upon aphasia studies in order to 
formulate and evaluate models of gestural expression. In a study by De Ruiter and De Beer 
8 
(2013), extensive consideration is given to how current competing theories may generate and 
accommodate the “modules” or psychic capacities that seems to be affected in non-fluent 
aphasia; their corresponding aim is to formulate a general theory of the psychic capacities 
that condition or constrain gestural and linguistic expression for aphasic and non-aphasic 
speakers alike. While such work has its place, the question remains whether these lines of 
inquiry are the only or most important ones when it comes to the conditions upon multimodal 
expression. Put in terms of Bühler’s critique, such perspectives risk approaching gestural and 
verbal expression, and their multimodal relationship, from the theoretical perspective of a 
“Diogenes im Fass,” which is to say, from the perspective of an organism closed in on itself 
(Bühler 1977: 37, 47); that is, from the perspective of an organism for whom the conditions 
and constraints upon the verbal or gestural expression of an affect are tantamount to the 
constraints upon the manifestation of that affect within the organism.  
BÜHLER: DIACRISIS, STEERING, STRUCTURE 
To explore the potential for Bühler’s contribution to understanding the conditions under 
which gestural and verbal expression are integrated and related, let us consider once more 
the above example of two persons communicating at a dig site. We can think of the gestures 
and the verbal speech of a communicating person as two expressly shared streams of 
information, addressed to another person, and as being about the same state of affairs, with 
a common communicative purpose driving both streams. When conceived in this way, the 
two streams show different kinds of relationships with each other; some seem merely 
possible ways of being related, while others seem necessary.   
On the side of the possible, the one stream may but need not hold a supplementary or 
repetitive relationship with respect to the other. The supplementary relationship means each 
stream can offer information not contained in the other, for instance, by way of completion 
or amplification, as in the above example where a gesture might provide a referent for the 
verbal utterance of a relative pronoun. A repetitive relationship means each stream can 
reiterate information given in the other, so as to enable the one to accent the other, or to 
enable a referring back in the one stream to information given in the other (anaphora); in the 
example above, the one archaeologist may trace a line with their gesture and a moment later 
also verbally describes the path of a line in the dirt.  
On the other hand, considered from the perspective of their mutual integration in acts 
of communication, there are other relationships between the two streams of gestures and 
verbal expression that seem required. One such would be their mutual non-interference with 
each other; each stream has to be able to offer information without hindering the information 
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given in the other stream. This might be thought of a no-noise principle of multimodal 
communication; uptake of the one, e.g. gestural, stream ought not prevent uptake of the other, 
verbal expression, nor vice versa. Another such candidate, related to the latter, would be the 
relationship of coordination or fit between the two streams. Such coordination is necessary if 
interaction and integration between the two streams is to be achieved; even when the one 
stream might undermine or contradict the other (e.g. in irony, sarcasm, or deception), still the 
two streams must be ‘in sync’ with each other. Such coordination, though required, can 
nonetheless take different forms. It might be syntactic, as in the one person’s gesture 
constituting the ‘noun’ of the verbally expressed prepositional phrase, or it may be temporal, 
as in the emphasis of the so-called ‘beated’ or anticipatory gesture which must fit the temporal 
frame of the verbal expression to which it would be matched.  
 These are just a few ways that gestures and speech may interact and be integrated, 
according to either their possible or necessary relationships. Yet how might one best 
elaborate further, refine, or correct such a characterisation of the integration of these two 
streams in communication? On our understanding, there are at least two Bühlerian concerns 
to be explored regarding this framing of the relationships between gesture and speech. A first 
concern would point to a crucial facet thus far missing from the depiction of the two streams. 
Namely, to which kind of meaningful form or structure of communication are these two 
streams to be understood as contributing? That is, Bühler would insist that there can never 
be two such streams in a communicative vacuum; he would thus call for consideration of the 
communicative structures [Sprachgebilde] and communicative products [Sprechwerke] in 
which these two streams and their interaction would always have to fit (Bühler 2011: 57-58).  
 A second concern has to do with the communicative functions fulfilled by the streams 
above (Bühler 2011: 35). It is easy to grasp that the one or other stream of information can 
be involved in representing something the communicator is thinking about (Darstellung), or 
in manifesting something the communicator is feeling (Ausdruck), or in drawing the listener’s 
attention to something in the environment (Appell), or indeed in some combination of these. 
However, when these streams of information would be directed at a receiver in an act of 
communication, by what means would the receiver be guided to the relevance of the one 
stream for the other, as well as their mutual relevance for the 'whole' meaning of the 
communicator's streams? This is a question not only when the streams would diverge in their 
functions, but just as much when those functions would align; it seems necessary that the 
receiver grasp their importance for each other in order to make sense of the streams, just as 
it seems necessary for the communicator to intend for their relationship to be taken in a 
certain way. For instance, by what means should a receiver distinguish what is merely 
extrinsic or ‘supplementary’ about the one stream for the other stream, from what might be 
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essential to their relationship? What is needed here, Bühler would suggest, is a principle of 
steering by which the relationship between the streams and their functions could be 
understood; in other words, what is needed in order to understand the relationship of 
gestures and verbal speech is a concept of diacrisis.  
 For the moment, let us focus on the second of these two concerns. Diacrisis (or 
sometimes diacritics) is a concept that Bühler draws from his investigations of phonology and 
the processes of perception thereby involved (2011: 42).13 On the one hand, it refers to a 
process of abstraction, whereby a person, an ear, or a finger can learn to distinguish the 
relevant from the irrelevant (ibid., 53), thus turning some of the information provided into a 
kind of background, context, or noise, and the remainder into the content of a perceptual 
apprehension. On the other hand, diacrisis for Bühler would equally indicate the result of such 
a process of abstraction regarding some quantity or quantities of information - aural, tactile, 
or symbolic; namely, this result is an (re-)orientation or a guiding of an individual in any given 
situation where a “decision between several possibilities has to be made” (ibid., 176). Per 
Bühler’s examples, this diacrisis means that via perceptual content one can be guided to a 
recognition that, e.g. there is a one-euro and not a two-euro coin in one's pocket. 
 In respect of a Bühlerian conception of multimodal expression via gesture and speech, 
two further aspects of the notion of diacrisis are of interest. First, although such diacrisis may 
be arrived at by an individual under their own power, it may also be instigated or initiated in 
communicative interaction. When a person returns home, for instance, and says ‘I’m home’ 
or ‘It’s me,’ the person upstairs hearing that utterance “is supposed to perform a personal 
diacrisis, more or less as if a personal name had been spoken” (Bühler 2011: 109); the speaker 
wants the listener to attend in the utterance only to those ‘distinguishing marks’ of the 
speaker’s sound of voice that allow the listener to identify just who is speaker. This kind of 
utterance is a kind of vocal pointing or steering of the listener to an aural identification; it 
should enable the listener to decide just who is speaking.14  At the same time, Bühler holds 
that diacrisis can occur not just in speech, but also in gestures, or in both at once. Either 
gesture or utterance can count as “islands of language emerg[ing] from within the sea of silent 
but unequivocal communication” (2011: 176) as we guide and are guided by others and as 
we coordinate our activities with others.15  
 Second, if diacrisis concerns a kind of steering towards a decision between certain 
possibilities of meaning, an important caveat here is that these are not mere empty 
possibilities but rather are ones constrained by two related but still distinct factors. First, the 
possibilities navigated by the diacrisis are already 'steered by the matter at issue' 
(Sachsteuerung) (Bühler 2011: 75-76), where such a matter may be understood as a content 
or state of affairs in respect of which certain understandings, responses, or actions - that is, 
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certain acts and courses of actions - are most likely. This aspect of the diacrisis reflects 
Bühler's structural leanings, according to which he would investigate the subject-
independent and law-like conditions under which humans communicate and act. Second, 
Bühler stresses that either the material world or other factors, like the dispositions of other 
persons, may restrict possibilities in light of which the diacrisis is effected. He thus refers to 
the “material clues” and “material guidance” (Stoffliche Steuerung) of the likely choices that 
one might make in a café, in getting on a bus, in hearing a voice in one’s home, and the like 
(ibid. 77, 194 ff.). Yet here one ought also to recall that for Bühler diacrisis takes place at many 
different levels of the communication process (ibid. 52); there is already diacrisis in the sound 
and the phoneme, between one gesture or word and another, between a representational 
function and an appelative function of a gesture or word, and so on.  
 Combining these thoughts, we arrive at the idea that every diacrisis, as a presentation 
and a choice of a meaningful possibility, occurs in a respect of a diacrisis at another level of 
complexity, higher or lower, in the communicative process. What this Bühlerian view thereby 
implies is that gestures and speech are answerable not only to their environments and the 
trajectories (Vorbahnungen) of the matter at issue jointly attended to by speaker and receiver 
(Knobloch 1988: 419). In addition, they may be crucially answerable to each other, in their 
relationship to the matter at hand and in providing a context for the performance of each. 
Thus, gestures may be instrumental in operating alongside speech in both aiding the 
distinction of one sound from another, one word from another, one concept from another, 
one kind of utterance from another, one kind of speaker’s intent from another. And the same 
would obtain for speech in relation to gestures as well. 
 How might this notion of the diacrisis allow one to expand or revise the above 
characterisation of multimodal expression via speech and gesture according to their possible 
and necessary relationships? One contribution concerns the question whether the 
relationships of non-interference and coordination between gesture and speech, constitute a 
complete picture of the necessary conditions of their integration and interaction. One 
hesitation about that picture could run as follows; even if it seems correct to insist the stream 
of gestures ought not disrupt the comprehension of the other stream, this condition could 
also be met by someone merely ignoring the one or other stream; our description would then 
miss the very phenomenon it means to target, namely the interaction of gesture and speech. 
Hence, in insisting upon a necessary relationship of non-interference, the implication cannot 
be that one stream can simply replace the other - at least, not if one takes these co-speech 
gestures not to be sheerly ‘self-directed’ or cognitive-facultative bodily movements with no 
meaning for the other person and no intention to be a matter of uptake.  
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As an improvement upon that picture, one may suggest that to the non-interference 
relationship has to be appended a non-negligible or diacritical relationship. According to this 
latter requirement, each stream has to occupy some position of relevance or importance with 
respect to the other stream with which it would be integrated (greater, lesser, equal). It would 
then be in view of this mutual relationship of relevance that the receiver of the integrated 
streams, gesture and speech, would then attend now primarily to the one or the other, or 
indeed both at once, in order to grasp the function of each stream, the nature of their roles 
with the communicative act, the course of action to which they may lead, and so on.  
 To put this differently, the diacritical relationship of the two streams would ensure 
that their receiver would be steered to the relevance of both streams for the matter at hand 
and the communicative situation. One might indeed wonder how that happens, yet on our 
view such a relationship would not entail that each stream must carry some 'meta-
information' about its relevance to the other stream. In some cases, as in the above example 
of an elliptical statement completed by a trowel gesture, this diacritical requirement seems 
fulfilled quite straightforwardly, for instance via the coordination (in this case alternation) of 
gesture and speech. In others, especially where the two streams are co-occurring and not 
consecutive, it may be more challenging to understand how this requirement is met, and here 
we can refer to an interesting distinction already made by Wundt between Hilfegebärden and 
Hauptgebärden; the former being gestures aimed at helping the comprehension of gestures, 
or in our example, aimed at directing attention to the mutual importance of the one or other 
stream, in a manner similar to deictic references in speech. Moreover, if we expand our 
multimodal scope for a moment, one might consider whether such steering occurs strictly via 
gestures or speech or whether it may also even occur via a yet third stream of information, 
such as prosody, the exchange of eye gazes, or bodily stances. 
  
 In the foregoing, we have attempted to demonstrate both why it can still be important 
to understand Wundt and the criticisms of him, and why Bühler can offer an account of 
gestural and multimodal expression which is at once amenable to empirical input and 
structural in its aims. However, this has been but an indication of the 1potential of Bühler's 
insights. For further development thereof, one area would the question how the necessary 
and possible relationships of gesture and speech fall within Bühler’s fourfold scheme of 
speech as "Act, Work, Action, and Structure" (2011: 57).  We might thereby explore what 
other relationships between gesture and speech we have missed, and thus take Bühler’s 
scheme as a guide for systematically exploring and interpreting the wide taxonomy of gesture 
actions and gesture texts recorded by anthropologists, linguists, and psychology in today’s 
13 
and yesterday’s human world. Where are they populous within Bühler's scheme? Where 
might each need to be filled out further, and why?  
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